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NOTE
FOREIGN SECURITY SURVEILLANCE-BALANCING
EXECUTIVE POWER AND
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
INTRODUCTION
Under the present state of the law, the President, based upon his own
unilateral determination, may intercept any and all communications of per-
sons he feels pose a threat to the national security. Despite recent attempts to
provide effective, reasonable guidelines for requiring judicial authorization
prior to intercepting such communications, no legislation has ensued.' The
perennial stumbling block has been the difficulty encountered in striking a
balance between the necessary and legitimate governmental use of electronic
surveillance in protecting the national security and insuring the protection of
personal liberties. 2 On March 29, 1976 the Senate Judiciary Committee began
the fourth set of hearings on warrantless electronic surveillance in as many
years.3 The highlight of these hearings, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 19764 (Foreign Intelligence Act) is the most recent, unsuccessful effort
at striking a fair and just balance between these two competing interests.
The fourth amendment guarantees an individual the right to be free from
unreasonable governmental searches and seizures. s The Supreme Court, in
interpreting what has been termed an indispensible freedom, 6 " 'has em-
1. S. Rep. No. 1035, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 n.2 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report],
citing S. 743, National Security Surveillance Act of 1975, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (197S); S. 1888,
Bill of Rights Procedures Act of 1975, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 2820, Surveillance Practices
and Procedures Act of 1973, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 4062, Freedom from Surveillance Act
of 1974, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
2. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 9, 11.
3. Id. at 9 n.3, citing Hearings on S. 743, S. 1888, S. 3197 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]; Subcomm. on Surveillance of the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations and the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, Warrantless Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975); Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure and
the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Warrantless
Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
Warrantless Wiretapping, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
4. S. 3197, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as the Foreign Intelligence Act].
5. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV.
6. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 274 (1973), quoting Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Upon his return from the Nuremberg
trials, Mr. Justice Jackson, greatly affected by the arbitrary governmental acts of the Nazi regime
performed at the expense of personal liberties, wrote that "[t]hese (fourth amendment rights], I
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phasized that the mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to
judicial processes' and that searches conducted outside of the judicial process
. . . are per se unreasonable . . . . "7 Review by an impartial judicial officer
prior to a search or seizure has been the "time tested" method of effectuating
fourth amendment protections,8 and is subject only to a few carefully de-
lineated exceptions. 9 Traditionally, however, the mandate of judicial process
has been limited to those searches or seizures accompanied by an actual
physical trespass, the absence of which precluded further fourth amendment
inquiry.10 It was not until 1967 that the Supreme Court, in Katz v. United
States ,11 held that the spirit and protection of the fourth amendment cannot
be limited by the presence or absence of physical trespass.12 In removing this
limitation the Court held that the electronic interception of private communi-
cations13 constituted a search and seizure under the fourth amendment and
protest, are not mere second-class rights but belong in the catalog of indispensible freedoms.
Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of
the individual and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first
and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government." Id.
7. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (citation omitted), quoting United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
8. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972). "The Fourth
Amendment contemplates a prior judicial judgment, not the risk that executive discretion may be
reasonably exercised. This judicial role accords with our basic constitutional doctrine that
individual freedoms will best be preserved through a separation of powers and division of
functions among the different branches and levels of Government." Id. at 317 (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 356-57 (1967); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
9. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 280-82 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring);
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972); Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958). It appears to be quite clear that
the ultimate standard set forth in the fourth amendment is one of reasonableness. Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973). Reasonableness turns only in part upon the warrant
requirement. However, those instances which have been exempted from the warrant requirement
have been based on exigent or other circumstances where delay would frustrate legitimate police
activity. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972) ("in general, [these
exceptions] serve the legitimate needs of law enforcement officers to protect their own well-being
and preserve evidence from destruction"); Jones v. United States,.357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958). Thus
we are left with the conclusion that whenever practicable the test of reasonableness will require a
judicial warrant prior to a search or seizure.
10. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129,
134-36 (1942); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 464, 466 (1928).
11. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
12. Id. at 352-53.
13. The term electronic interception or surveillance includes the interception of communica-
tions by means of "bugging" and "wiretapping." Bugging is a technique by which oral communi-
cations, not transmitted by wire, are intercepted. Wiretapping is a technique by which any
communication (not necessarily oral) transmitted by wire may be intercepted. Both techniques are
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was thus subject to its mandate of judicial process. ' 4 However, the Court has
never held the warrant provision applicable to the President's use of electronic
surveillance when employed for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence
information to protect the national security. 15 On the other hand, the Court
has never specifically carved out an exception from the warrant provision for
these national security surveillances. 1 6 In essence there is a gap in the
included in the term electronic surveillance as used within this Note unless a distinction is
otherwise indicated.
14. 389 U.S. at 353. Prior to its decision in Katz, the Court had held that absent an actual
physical trespass the use of electronic surveillance did not constitute a search or seizure for
purposes of the fourth amendment. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). A bugging
device must be implanted upon either the sender or receiver of the oral communication, thus
requiring a trespass. A wiretap, on the other hand, may be employed externally by tapping into
wires at some point between the sender and receiver. Thus under the trespass test, while
warrantless trespassory bugging devices were prohibited by fourth amendment warrant protec-
tion, those wiretaps conducted without a trespass were not.
15. In Katz, while holding the warrant requirement applicable to electronic surveillance, the
Court explicitly declined to include in its holding those cases "involving the national security."
389 U.S. at 358 n.23. In refusing to include national security cases in its holding, however, the
Court also neglected to define what would constitute a national security case. Id. Thus, it could
be argued that any threat to the security of the nation-be it internal or external-was included in
the term national security. In a subsequent decision, however, the Court distinguished between
foreign and domestic national security cases. In United States v. United States Dist. Court
(Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972), the Court held that those cases involving purely domestic aspects of
the national security were subject to the warrant provision of the fourth amendment. Id. at 321.
Thus the broad "national security" reservation in Katz had been reduced to include only "foreign
security" cases since the Court, in Keith, refused to express any opinion as to the issues raised by
the foreign aspects of national security. Id. at 308-09, 321-22.
The domestic aspects of the national security are those cases where the threat to the nation
comes from a wholly internal source. A group or person is wholly domestic when it is neither a
foreign power nor an agent of a foreign power. Thus a political organization based in the United
States, receiving all economic and human resources from within the United States would be
considered domestic.
The foreign aspects of the national security concern those cases where the threat to the nation
comes from a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. A foreign agent would seem to
include any person or organization which works closely or conspires with, or under the direction
of a foreign power. Thus a political organization based in the United States and composed totally
of American citizens which receives substantial financial support from a foreign power would,
apparantly, be considered a foreign agent.
For the purposes of this Note, given the above definition, the terms domestic and foreign
security shall be used independently.
16. In a footnote to the Keith decision the Court noted the view of several authorities that,
while prohibited in the domestic area, warrantless surveillances may be permissible in the foreign
area. United States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 322 n.20 (1972). While at
least one court has relied upon this footnote as carving out an exception to the warrant provision
where foreign security is involved, United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 425-26 (Sth Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974), it seems the better view, in light of the Court's refusal to
express an opinion on the issue, 407 U.S. at 321-22, that the Court was merely citing these
authorities for informational purposes rather than suggesting that an exception be carved out in
the area of foreign security.
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decisions concerning fourth amendment safeguards where national security
surveillances are employed. Moreover, Congress has failed to enact any
legislation regulating the use of national security surveillances. 1 7
The Foreign Intelligence Act was aimed at filling the national security gap
by requiring a judicial warrant prior to the implementation of national
security electronic surveillances. 18 The Act was largely a response to the
revelation of abusive warrantless electronic surveillance which was per-
formed in the name of national security, 19 the most serious of which was
found to exist during the Johnson and Nixon administrations. During these
administrations conversations between certain legislators and foreign officials
were intercepted by FBI wiretaps and bugging devices and the information
forwarded to the President. 20 Although none of these legislators were the
actual targets of the warrantless surveillances, their conversations were
"overheard" through the intercepted communications of certain "foreign
targets.121 Thus, the types of abuses flowing from the national security gap,
17. Congress has enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970). This Act was designed to provide the procedural requirements
for obtaining an order (warrant) authorizing electronic surveillance employed in criminal investi-
gations. Thus while the use of criminal surveillances has been regulated by federal legislation, no
similar requirement exists in the foreign surveillance area.
18. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 11.
19. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 9-10.
20. N.Y. Times, May 10, 1976, at 14, cols. 4-7. It was felt by Presidents Johnson and Nixon
that many of the protests against their respective Vietnam policies, particularly those voiced In
certain Senate hearings, were generated by foreign officials. Id.
21. Id. These abuses are not limited to merely overhearing the conversations of American
citizens while speaking to foreign officials (or agents), but include the possibility of these
American citizens being classified as foreign agents by virtue of these communications and, In
fact, becoming targets themselves. See text accompanying notes 58-60 infra.
For a number of other cases in which the national security was used to disguise certain
questionable executive branch surveillances see generally 119 Cong. Rec. S 23026 (daily ed. Dec.
17, 1973). The more significant abuses were: (1) installation in 1969 of warrantless wiretaps on 13
government officials and four newsmen, purportedly because they were leaking or publishing
sensitive foreign intelligence information. Two of these wiretaps were even continued after their
subjects had left government service and had begun working on Senator Muskie's presidential
campaign (see generally Hearings on the Role of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger in the Wiretapping of
Certain Government Officials and Newsmen Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)), (2) White House authorization in 1969 of a burglary of the home of
newspaper columnist Joseph Kraft for installation of an alleged national security wiretap; (3)
invocation of national security in inducing the CIA to assist in the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's
psychiatrist's offices; (4) the 1970 drafting by the White House of a plan to engage in massive
warrantless wiretapping and burglary which, although approved on national security grounds,
was scrapped after objection from FBI Director Hoover; (5) surveillance by the Kennedy
Administration of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and other civil rights activists who were suspected
of being Communist sympathizers or dupes.
Such examples, multiplied several times over, demonstrate the need for judicial scrutiny of
Executive surveillance practices. Indeed, one might even question whether the Government
would have had the audacity to present many of these practices to a neutral magistrate had a
warrant been required.
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though directed at foreign targets, directly affect American citizens. 22
The purpose of this Note is to examine the Foreign Intelligence Act and
those constitutional issues raised by its attempt to fill the national security
vacuum. In this effort the history of the gap and the presidential claim of an
inherent constitutional power to operate unencumbered by legislative stric-
tures in the national security area will be investigated.
THE GAP
Over three decades ago President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent a confidential
memorandum to Attorney General Jackson which authorized him "to secure
information by listening devices directfed] to the conversation or other com-
munications of persons suspected of subversive activities against the Govern-
ment of the United States, including suspected spies. "2 3 The memo further
requested that these investigative techniques be "conducted to a minimum
and limit[ed] ... insofar as possible to aliens." 24 This memo has served as the
cornerstone for the assertion of seven administrations that the President can
authorize warrantless electronic surveillance for national security purposes.2s
This presidential power, it is claimed, is constitutionally based in the
executive's power to conduct the nation's foreign affairs and, consequently, is
immune from the constitutional restraints of the fourth amendment 2 6 To
assess the viability of this argument one must first understand the relationship
between electronic surveillance and fourth amendment protections.
In Olmstead v. United States,"7 the Supreme Court held that absent a
physical trespass, the interception of communications did not constitute a
search or seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 28 In rendering
22. The purpose behind the amendments to the Constitution were to insure the protection of
certain personal liberties from the possibility of governmental encroachment. This spirit of
personal liberty was broader than any governmental encroachment contemplated at the time the
amendments were enacted. As Justice Brandeis pointed out in his dissenting opinion to the
Olmstead decision: "The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of
espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some day be developed by which the
Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and
... expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. Advances in the psychic and
related sciences may bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions."
Olnstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
23. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (plurality opinion),
cerL denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
24. Id.
25. Id.; Senate Report, supra note 1, at 11-12; Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 1.
26. E.g., Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d. 594, 616-19 & nn. 65-66 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc)
(plurality opinion), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Senate Report, supra note 1, at 13-IS,
Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 1.
27. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
28. Id. at 466. In establishing a trespassory/non-tresspassory distinction for purposes of fourth
amendment protections, the Court included bugging as a search and seizure since bugging could
be accomplished only by means of a physical trespass. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 618 &
n.64 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (plurality opinion), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). In his
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the fourth amendment inapposite, the Court also removed the necessity for an
assertion, by either President Roosevelt or subsequent administrations, of a
presidential immunity since there were no constitutional restraints from which
to be immune. 29 Thus it seems that both the Roosevelt memorandum and the
subsequent presidential practice of authorizing warrantless national security
surveillances were not claims to an immunity from constitutional restraints.
30
It was not until 1967 that the Supreme Court, in Katz v. United States,3 1
held that the electronic interception of personal conversations in and of itself
constituted a search and seizure and was entitled to the protection of the
fourth amendment. 32 In discarding its prior trespassory/non-trespassory dis-
tinction, the Court emphasized that "the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places" 33 and the legitimate expectations of conversational privacy were to
be shielded from the uninvited ear of government. 34 The Court noted,
however, that its opinion did not deal with foreign security matters and,
consequently, avoided the question of "[w]hether safeguards other than prior
authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a
situation involving the national security . . . . 35 The thrust of the Court's
decision, the national security reservation notwithstanding, was to prohibit,
for the first time, all warrantless electronic surveillance as an unconstitutional
search and seizure. Consequently, in order to continue these surveillances it is
necessary for the President to assert an immunity either from the fourth
amendment as a whole, or merely from its warrant provision. 36
dissent Justice Brandeis vigorously opposed the majority's trespassory/non-tresspassory distinc-
tion as an invitation to the infringement of personal privacy. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 473-75 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
29. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 617-18 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (plurality opinion),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
30. Later cases had, however, construed section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of
1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970), superseded by 18 U.S.C §§ 2510-20 (1970), as prohibiting the
interception of communications. E.g., Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). However,
this was a statutory limitation upon wiretapping. Consequently, until Katz, there remained no
constitutional restrictions on the President's power to conduct wiretaps.
31. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
32. Id. at 353.
33. Id. at 351.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 358 n.23. It is possible to read this footnote as indicating that at least some
satisfaction of the fourth amendment would be necessary. (The concurring opinions of Justices
Douglas and White differed on this point. Compare 389 U.S. at 359 (Douglas, J., concurring)
with 389 U.S. at 363-64 (White, J., concurring).) It therefore appears possible that where the
national security is involved other safeguards (e.g., post-surveillance warrants) may render the
surveillance reasonable. United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974).
36. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 618-19, (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (plurality opinion),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). Congress, responding to the Katz decision, enacted Title I of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 which established specific procedural
requirements for obtaining a warrant authorizing the use of electronic surveillance. 18 U.S.C. §§
2510-20 (1970). An integral part of this legislation was the controversial Title I1 Presidential
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In United States v. United States District Court (Keith)37 the Court
addressed the issue of whether the President could be subject to the warrant
requirement where the domestic aspects of national security were involved. 38
These include only those targets of electronic surveillance which are wholly
domestic---e.g., citizens of the United States who have neither direct nor
indirect involvement with a foreign power or its agents. 39 In Keith, three
United States nationals charged with conspiring to destroy government prop-
erty sought full disclosure of conversations intercepted by electronic devices.
The conversations were intercepted without a warrant to obtain information
relevant to national security. The defendants alleged that the intercepted
conversations might have tainted the evidence upon which the indictment was
based and should properly be excluded since they were procured as a result of
an illegal or unreasonable search or seizure.40 The government's defense was
that these wiretaps, installed for national security reasons pursuant to a
constitutional power of the President, were reasonable for the purposes of the
fourth amendment. 41 The Government asserted lack of judicial competence,
the potential for security leaks, the need for strategic information gathering
and an undue administrative burden as possible grounds for exempting such
surveillances from judicial scrutiny. 42
In considering the applicability of the fourth amendment warrant require-
ment to domestic security surveillances, the Court engaged in a balancing of
Disclaimer which provides, in part, that "[niothing contained in this chapter.. . shall limit the
constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the
Nation . . . to obtain foreign intelligence information . . . or to protect national security
information against foreign intelligence activities." Id. § 2511(3). Disclaimer is the term ordinarily
used to characterize 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970). E.g., Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 663
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (plurality opinion), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). On its face, this
provision appears to disclaim any intention of legislating in the area of national security.
Moreover, the entire Act, with the exception of the presidential disclaimer, is clearly directed
toward electronic surveillance employed in the context of criminal investigations. It has been
suggested, however, that this provision was not designed to be a final disclaimer but, rather, to
depend upon subsequent judicial determination of the President's power to issue warrantless
national security surveillances. Note, Electronic Intelligence Gathering and the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 331, 333-39 (1975). Should the Court
hold that the President has the power to issue warrantless national security surveillances, the
provision would disclaim any intent to legislate. However, should it be ultimately resolved that
no such constitutional power exists, the disclaimer would have the reverse effect of subjecting the
President to the Act's procedural requirements. Id.
37. 407 U.S. 297 (1972). It was against Judge Keith that a mandamus proceeding was
brought to prevent disclosure of electronic surveillance information to a criminal defendant. This
decision, therefore, is called the Keith case after District Judge Damon Keith.
38. Id. at 302.
39. See note 11 supra.
40. 407 U.S. at 299-300.
41. Id. at 318-19. The government interpreted the Title III Presidential disclaimer to mean
that "'in excepting national security surveillances from the Act's warrant requirement Congress
recognized the President's authority to conduct such surveillances without prior judicial ap-
proval."' Id. at 303.
42. Id. at 318-21.
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the basic governmental and individual interests at stake.4 3 On the one hand
was the duty of the President to protect the domestic security, and on the
other the potential dangers that warrantless surveillances pose to an individ-
ual's privacy and freedom of expression. 44 These interests were balanced not
only against each other but also against the basic tenets underlying the fourth
amendment.4 s The Court held that the warrant requirement was applicable in
cases involving the domestic aspects of national security intelligence gathering
and specifically rejected the establishment of an exception to the warrant
requirement in that area.46
The protection afforded by the Keith decision appears to be very limited.
The only persons afforded protection are those who come under the classifi-
cation of wholly domestic. 47 The Court neglected to specifically define what
was and was not contained in the domestic aspects of national security
cases. 48 Suppose a group or organization consists entirely of American citi-
zens, yet is funded to some extent by a foreign power. Is this organization
now precluded from the protection afforded by Keith? Moreover, if an
individual has significant contact with a foreign power or its representatives,
will such contact render this person a foreign agent for purposes of fourth
amendment protections? Thus, any situation which is not wholly domestic
may be classified as foreign and, therefore, precluded from the protection
given by Keith. 49
THE ACT
After more than three decades of warrantless electronic surveillance in the
area of national security, the scope of presidential power and the constitu-
tional restraints upon it remain a mystery.50 The Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act of 1976 would have done much to solve this mystery by imposing
substantive and procedural controls on the use of electronic surveillance for
43. Id. at 310-13.
44. Id. at 316-18.
45. Id. at 321. Since no warrant had been obtained in this case, it was unnecessary for the
Court to consider the applicability of Title III procedural requirements and the Court declined to
do so. Id. at 308. Moreover, in construing the Presidential disclaimer provision it was found that
the provision was totally neutral in that it neither conferred nor limited the President's power in
the national security area-it merely left the presidential powers where it found them. Id. at 303.
Thus, no congressional exemption to the warrant requirement was found to exist.
46. The thrust of the Keith decision appears to be that the warrant requirement may not be
suspended merely because there exists a legitimate governmental need to engage in certain
activity. Id. at 310-14. Moreover, if an exception is to be carved out of the warrant provision, the
justification for such an exception must be somewhat compelling to justify the suspension of
conversational privacy. Cf. id. at 319-21.
47. Id. at 309 & n.8.
48. Id.
49. Cf. id.
50. See Senate Report, supra note 1, at 18-20; Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 7-13
(statement of Attorney General Levi); L.E.A.A. Newsletter, June 1976, at 6, cols. 1-3.
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foreign intelligence purposes. Unfortunately, after extensive debate and
amendment, time ran out and the Act was left for re-introduction in the 95th
Congress. Nevertheless, an analysis of its provisions and possible effects is a
valuable enterprise for a number of reasons. First, the Foreign Intelligence
Act is the fifth such act proposed concerning the regulation of warrantless
foreign security surveillances since 1973.51 This indicates that in all probabil-
ity another attempt to legislate in this area will soon be made. Second, the
great need for legislation evidenced by past abuses renders the probability of
future legislation almost a certainty.5 2 Third, this Act, largely a composite of
all its unsuccessful predecessors, is the result of all the hearings and debates
surrounding the previous Acts and is likely to be relied upon when its
successor is introduced. Thus, the new bill will probably be quite similar to
the Foreign Intelligence Act of 1976.
As previously noted, the Act was directed specifically at filling the gap left
by the Keith decision by addressing the foreign aspects of national security
surveillances. s 3 A foreign power, as defined by this Act, includes not only
members of a foreign government, political party, or military force but also
foreign commercial entities doing business in the United States and foreign
based terrorist groups.5 4 By its terms, the Act provides protection not only to
those persons directly involved in the foreign government but also to those
who, even though possibly opposed to the foreign government in power (e.g.,
terrorist groups), may be so related to its political scene as to be a valuable
source of intelligence information and, as such, a likely target of surveillance.
An agent of a foreign power is similarly defined in very broad and inclusive
terms. An agent may either be a non-permanent resident alien who is an
officer or employee of a foreign power or any person, including an American
citizen, who, under the direction of a foreign power, engages in "clandestine
intelligence activities, sabotage, or terrorist activities, or who conspires with,
or knowingly aids or abets such a person in engaging in such activities."55
These definitions would help to accomplish two goals. First, as protection
afforded foreign powers and agents is increased, more protection is afforded
to those American citizens who are likely to communicate with them. As
noted previously, one need not be the target of a national security surveillance
to have personal liberties violated since anyone communicating with a foreign
power (or its agent) is vulnerable to the interception of communications.5 6
Second, it avoids the application of a double standard of fourth amendment
protections afforded to those persons who are wholly domestic. As the law
stands now any persons (non-foreign power or agent) conversing with one
another are assured that if their conversation is intercepted by the govern-
51. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 9 & n.2.
52. Id. at 9-11; see note 21 supra.
53. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 8, 11-18.
54. Foreign Intelligence Act § 2521(b)(S). The term "foreign power" means those persons
officially affiliated with a foreign power such as an ambassador, minister or the like.
55. Id. § 2521(b)(ii).
56. See text accompanying notes 20-21, 47-49 supra.
19771 1187
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ment, it is done so pursuant to prior judicial authorization.- 7 However, either
person, if communicating with a foreign power, an agent of a foreign power,
or anyone having a significant connection with either, has no such assur-
ance.
58
After defining its terms and scope, the Act goes on to provide specific
procedural requirements to be followed in submitting applications to the court
for an order authorizing a foreign intelligence surveillance.3 9 These pro-
cedural requirements may be divided into administrative, 60 judicial, 61 and
general safeguards. 62
Concerning the administrative safeguards, the Act requires that before an
application be made to the court it must first be authorized by the President
and then approved by the Attorney General. 63 An application under this act is
properly authorized by the President only when he has, in writing, empow-
ered the Attorney General to approve applications for submission to the
court. 64 The purpose of this procedure is to insure that the President in fact
wants to carry on foreign intelligence surveillance and that the Attorney
General is not acting upon his own determination that such surveillance is
necessary. 65
57. This conclusion is dictated by the Supreme Court decision in United States v. United
States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 314-21 (warrant required in cases involving the domestic aspects
of national security intelligence gathering).
58. Thus, there is no assurance that such a surveillance is reasonable--i.e., based upon
probable cause. The situation presented by this fact pattern appears to present severe first
amendment problems. As indicated above, if an American citizen decides to communicate with a
foreign official he runs two risks. First, there is the risk that if their communication is being
intercepted as a result of the foreign official being a target of a national security surveillance,
there is no assurance that the interception is reasonable since no judicial warrant need be secured.
Thus, the surveillance may be based upon the sole determination of the current administration
that such surveillance is necessary. Second, there is the risk that the American citizen by
communicating with this foreign official will be deemed to have such significant foreign ties as to
be himself classified as a foreign agent. Thus, a domestic person may refrain from communicating
with a foreign official for fear of either a warrantiess interception of the communication or being
classified as a foreign agent as a result of the communication. In either case the chilling effect
upon the person's freedom of speech and association are clear. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d
594, 633-35 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (plurality opinion), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); cf.
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 313 ("National security cases . . . often
reflect a convergence of First and Fourth Amendment values not present in cases of 'ordinary'
crime. Though the investigative duty ... may be stronger in such-cases, so also is there greater
jeopardy to constitutionally protected speech.').
39. Foreign Intelligence Act §§ 2522-27.
60. Id. §§ 2522, 2524, 2527.
61. Id. § 2525.
62. Id. § 2523.
63. Id. § 2522.
64. Id.
65. Only one written authorization is required to empower the Attorney General to approve
applications in any number of surveillances for as long as the President lets the single authoriza-
tion stand. See Senate Report, supra note 1, at 34.
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The application itself is quite detailed to insure the existence and reliability
of the facts giving rise to the particular surveillance. It is also necessary to
reveal the identity of the targets of the surveillance, and the specific tech-
niques to be employed. The application must further state the facts relied
upon in classifying the targets as foreign, the information sought as foreign
intelligence information, and how the government intends to minimize the
interception of unrelated information. 66
The judicial safeguards dictate that a judge shall, if the application was
properly authorized by the President and approved by the Attorney General,
enter an ex parte order approving the surveillance. The judge must affirm
that the facts submitted to him establish probable cause to believe that the
target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and that the
information sought is foreign intelligence information. Finally, he must con-
firm that the procedures are reasonably designed to minimize the collection of
unrelated information .67
The general requirements essentially designate the judges to grant orders
for electronic surveillance and the appellate route to be followed by the
Attorney General upon the denial of an order.68 The Act also provides that
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall designate seven district court
judges, each of whom will have jurisdiction to hear applications for and grant
orders approving electronic surveillance. 69 Further, the Chief Justice would,
under the Act, designate three judges to comprise a special court of appeals to
hear appeals by the United States from the denial of any application.7" The
Government would have the right to appeal an affirmance of a denial by that
court to the Supreme Court. All appeals are to be heard and determined as
expeditiously as possible. 71 The Act provides that applications and orders be
sealed by the presiding judge and kept according to security measures to be
established by the Chief Justice and the Attorney General. 72
The final and, from a constitutional perspective, the most controversial
section of the Act is that which squarely addresses the power of the President
in the area of foreign intelligence gathering. Section 2528, entitled "Presiden-
tial Power," 7 3 provides, in essence, that nothing contained in the Act was
intended to affect the exercise of any constitutional power the President may
66. Foreign Intelligence Act § 2524.
67. Id. § 2525. Subsection (a) of this section specifies the findings the judge must make before
he grants an order approving the use of electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes.
While the issue of the order is mandatory if all the requirements of subsection (a) are present, the
judge has discretionary power to modify the order sought-e.g., the period of authorization or the
minimization procedures to be followed.
68. Id. § 2523(a) & (b).
69. Id. § 2523(b).
70. Id.
71. Id. § 2523(c). The Attorney General has access to this special court of appeals as a matter
of right. Id. § 2523(b). The appeal as of right applies even to appeals to the Supreme Court. Query
if this also includes the right to a rehearing if the Supreme Court should deny the application?
72. Id. § 2523(c).
73. Id. § 2528.
1977] 1189
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
have to gather foreign intelligence information through the use of electronic
surveillance if either the surveillance falls outside the definition of electronic
surveillance or "the facts and circumstances giving rise to the acquisition are
so unprecedented and potentially harmful to the Nation that they cannot be
reasonably said to have been within the contemplation of Congress in
enacting this chapter ... Provided, That in such an event the President shall,
within a reasonable time thereafter, transmit to the Committees on the
Judiciary of the Senate and House of Representatives" the facts surrounding
this unprecedented situation. 74 The purpose of this section was to clearly
establish the intent of Congress to legislate in the area of foreign intelligence
gathering by regulating the exercise of presidential powers-be they constitu-
tionally based or not-in all but two well defined situations: i.e., if the
surveillance did not come within the definition of electronic surveillance or
the facts were unprecedented and potentially harmful. 75
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RAMIFICATIONS OF IMPOSING A WARRANT
REQUIREMENT ON THE PRESIDENT IN NATIONAL SECURITY CASES
The Applicability of the Fourth Amendment
The attempt to regulate foreign intelligence surveillance through the
Foreign Intelligence Act raises three constitutional issues. First, given the
sweeping language in a number of cases addressing the President's constitu-
tional power to conduct foreign affairs, may the exercise of such power be
implemented without regard for the fourth amendment? Second, assuming the
applicability of the fourth amendment to the President's foreign affairs
powers, will the warrant provision unduly fetter the legitimate exercise of
these powers? Third, assuming that the warrant provision presents no undue
restraint upon this power, does the Foreign Security Act, which would require
more than merely obtaining a search warrant, unduly fetter these powers?76
74. Id.
75. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 49-54; Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 16-20.
76. During the hearings and in the final report of the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and
Procedures a fourth constitutional problem was raised. The subcommittee felt that the question of
whether Congress may legislate in an area where the President has a constitutional power was a
major barrier for this piece of legislation to hurdle. Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 2 (remarks
of Senator McClellan); Senate Report, supra note 1, at SO-S. In order to justify this Act the
Committee relied exclusively upon the Supreme Court's decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). In Youngstown, President Truman, relying upon his
constitutional war powers, ordered the seizure and operation of certain steel mills in order to
avert a nation-wide strike of steel workers during the Korean War. The Court's opinion,
narrowly drawn, held that the President had no power stemming either from Congress or the
Constitution to seize steel mills. Id. at 585-86.
Justice Jackson, in his concurring opinion, wrote: "When the President takes measures
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for
then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of
Congress over the matter." Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). In the Senate Report this
[Vol. 451190
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The power to engage in foreign intelligence gathering may be implied as a
necessary concomitant of the President's express powers as Commander-
in-Chief of the armed forces, 77 as the officer in charge of the nation's foreign
affairs, 78 and as the protector and defender of the Constitution. 7 9 While there
is no dispute that from these express powers the implied power to engage in
foreign security surveillances may be inferred, what remains to be decided is
whether these constitutional powers render the fourth amendment inapplica-
ble.
There are two leading Supreme Court cases which, though not concerned
with the fourth amendment, are cited in support of the contention that foreign
concurring opinion was constantly referred to. E.g., Senate Report, supra note 1, at 50-52, 75
n. 13 (views of Senators Abourezk, Hart, and Mathias), 141 (minority view of Senator Tunney).
Moreover, Attorney General Levi interpreted the Youngstown decision as indicating "that when a
statute prescribes a method of domestic action adequate to the President's duty to protect the
national security, the President is legally obliged to follow it." Senate Report, supra note 1, at 51
& n.36.
The subcommittee's absolute reliance upon Youngstown seems misplaced for two reasons.
First, the Court's holding in Youngstown was that no constitutional power was found to exist to
justify the President's activities. In regard to national security intelligence, the Supreme Court has
recognized the existence of a Presidential power, although presently undefined, to gather such
information. Cf. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 310-12. Thus, the
recognized existence of a constitutional power seems to preclude any reliance (certainly absolute
reliance) upon Youngstown. Second, in Youngstown, even assuming that the Jackson concur-
rence was the Court's holding, the Taft-Hartley Act was enacted before the President seized the
mills. In contrast, in the case of national security intelligence gathering, the Court will be faced
with legislation that comes after over thirty years of Presidential practice. See Senate Report,
supra note 1, at 13-15; Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 1. Moreover, given this prior executive
practice, it is at least possible (reversing the Jackson reasoning in Youngstown) that where
Congress takes measures incompatible with established presidential practice, their power is at its
lowest ebb. Such a reversal of Jackson's reasoning, so heavily relied upon by the subcommittee,
could prove devastating to any future attempt to legislate in the area of foreign security.
It seems that rather than stretching the Youngstown case to its limits (if, in fact, not surpassing
them), the better course would be simply to rely upon the necessary and proper clause, U.S.
Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18, which provides that Congress shall have power "[tlo make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution... (the] Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States. .. ." Id. The classic construction of the
powers expressed in the necessary and proper clause is that of Chief Justice Marshall in
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819): "Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional." Id. at 421. Thus "[wihatever legislation is appropriate . . . to
carry out the objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the
prohibitions they contain, . . . is brought within the domain of congressional power." Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879). It seems, therefore, that the fourth amendment is a proper
subject of legislative action to secure its guarantees. Cf. Katzenback v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966) (Congress may legislate to secure the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment).
77. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, d. 1.
78. Id. § 2, d. 1, 2.
79. Id. § 1, d. 8.
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intelligence surveillance is immune from the requirements of this amendment.
In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. ,80 the Court held that the
federal government's domestic and foreign powers are of a very different
scope because they differ in origin and nature. It then stated that in relation to
foreign affairs the President alone has the power to act as representative of
our nation. Moreover, the Court noted that confidential sources are necessary
to the exercise of his duties, and, consequently, they should remain confiden-
tial. 8 ' Later, Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship
Corp. 8 2 stated that in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief and as the organ of
foreign affairs, the President "has available intelligence services whose reports
are not and ought not to be published to the world. It would be intolerable
that courts, without the relevant information, should review and perhaps
nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret. '83
Two recent circuit court decisions have expressly addressed warrantless
foreign security surveillances and have resolved these cases based upon the
sweeping language contained in Curtiss-Wright and Waterman.84 The Fifth
Circuit, in United States v. Brown,8 - held that warrantless foreign security
surveillances were constitutionally permissible. The opinion declared that on
the basis of "the President's constitutional duty to act for the United States in
the field of foreign relations, and his inherent power to protect national
security in the context of foreign affairs.., the President may constitutionally
authorize warrantless wiretaps for the purpose of gathering foreign intelli-
gence." 8 6 The Court added that any "[r]estrictions upon the President's power
which are appropriate in cases of domestic security become artificial in the
context of the international sphere. '87 In United States v. Butenko,88 the
Third Circuit reached the same conclusion, finding that these surveillances
would be reasonable without a warrant even though some abuses may arise. 89
The Third and Fifth Circuits' decisions are based on very conclusory
analytic frameworks and tend more to confuse than to clarify the issues of
presidential power and the applicability of constitutional restraints. In Brown,
the court failed to pay even lipservice to the type of constitutional analysis
suggested by the Keith decision: there was no attempt at balancing the various
interests at stake. The Fifth Circuit merely stated that the President has the
power to authorize intelligence gathering by means of warrantless electronic
80. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
81. Id. at 315-20.
82. 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
83. Id. at 111.
84. United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 602 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
881 (1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960
(1974). See also United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424, 426 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (dictum); United
States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165, 171 (5th Cir. 1970), reversed on other grounds, 403 U.S. 698 (1971).
85. 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974).
86. Id. at 426.
87. Id.
88. 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974).
89. Id.
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surveillance. 90 In Butenko, the Third Circuit ignored the Supreme Court's
rejection of post-search sanctions as offering viable fourth amendment protec-
tions in the domestic area and relied, without explanation, upon this procedure
as a means of affording adequate protection in the foreign security area. 91 Thus
these decisions are better viewed as evidencing the on-going struggle between the
constitutional issues raised by foreign security surveillances rather than as a
clarification of these problems. 92
In Zweibon v. Mitchell,93 the District of Columbia Circuit, while limiting
its holding to requiring a warrant prior to the surveillance of a domestic
organization, questioned whether any national security exception to the
warrant requirement would be constitutional. 94 Unlike the Fifth and Third
Circuit cases, the Zweibon opinion, written by Judge J. Skelly Wright,
presented a complete and detailed analysis of the issues raised by foreign
security surveillances, paralleling the type of fourth amendment analysis
employed by the Supreme Court in Keith.9s After a brief survey of cases
recognizing the vast scope of the President's power to conduct foreign affairs,
the court dismissed the possibility that the fourth amendment may be in-
applicable in the area of foreign security surveillances. 96 While recognizing
that there is support for the proposition that the President's powers concern-
ing foreign affairs are not limited to those specifically enumerated in the
constitution, the Zweibon court stated that they did not override the fourth
amendment but, rather, had to be reconciled with it.97
This conclusion appears to be well grounded. In Curtiss-Wright,9" the
Court itself recognized that "like every other governmental power, [the
President's plenary power over foreign relations] must be exercised in subor-
dination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution. " 99 The question
actually presented in Curtiss-Wright was the constitutionality of a congres-
sional delegation of power in granting the President authority to prohibit arms
90. United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960
(1974).
91. United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974).
92. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 18 n.17 (noting the lack of systematic analysis of the
Brown and Butenko decisions), 80 n.24 (additional views of Senators Abourezk, Hart, and
Mathias reaching the same conclusion).
93. 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (plurality opinion), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944
(1976).
94. Id. at 613-14.
95. Id. at 612-13.
96. Id. at 626-27, 633-34, 641. The Court considered the argument that the conduct of foreign
affairs is an exercise of the President's political power and as such beyond judicial review. Id. at
620-21. Consideration was also given to the evidentiary privilege of the Executive concerning the
production of documents whose publication might endanger either military or diplomatic secrets.
Id. at 625-27. Although these points are beyond the scope of this Note, it should be noted that as
to each argument the Court found no bar to its consideration of fourth amendment protections.
Id. at 620-21, 625-26.
97. Id. at 627.
98. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
99. Id. at 320.
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shipments to an area of armed conflict.'00 The Court did not address the
question of whether these powers are to be exercised in accordance with the
strictures of the fourth amendment. 101 The Waterman'0 2 decision was cloaked
in very broad language concerning the President's foreign affairs powers. 103
The question presented was the judicial review of certain presidential acts
concerning foreign air transportation.' 0 4 Again, the Court did not address the
exercise of these powers in the context of the fourth amendment.105 Thus,
these cases, so often cited as establishing the breadth of the foreign affairs
powers, do little more than identify and define these powers in a context
where there was no assertion of an express countervailing constitutional
limitation.
To conclude that the President's power in this area is to be tested outside
the framework of the fourth amendment would, as the Zweibon court noted,
be to ignore the series of cases which have adhered to the principle-even in
time of war and civil insurrection-that the President cannot exercise his
power without regard for the Bill of Rights. 10 6 For example, in Ex parte
Milligan,10 the Court prevented the President from suspending the sixth
amendment right to jury trial where the courts were open and their process
available.108 A similar result was reached in Duncan v. Kahanamoku,109
where the substitution of military law for civilian process was held uncon-
stitutional despite allegations that Hawaii was in danger of attack and martial
law was necessary for its protection." 0 Further support for this position can
be found in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell,"' where the
Court, in dictum, stated that "even the war power does not remove constitu-
tional limitations safeguarding essential liberties."'1 2 Finally, in United States
v. Washington Post Co., 3 the Government urged the court to restrain the
publication of the contents of a classified study recounting the history of
American decision-making on Vietnam policy, asserting that the defense
interests of the United States would be greatly prejudiced.114 The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Government had
100. Id. at 314-15.
101. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d at 621-22.
102. 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
103. Id. at 111 (dictum).
104. Id. at 104-06.
105. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d at 622-23.
106. Id. at 621-23, 626-27.
107. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
108. Id. at 121.
109. 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
110. Id. at 316-17.
111. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
112. Id. at 426 (dictum).
113. 446 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam), aff'd sub nom. New York Times v.
United States 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
114. Id. at 1328.
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not overcome the first amendment's presumption against the constitutionality
of prior restraints on the press s and the Supreme Court affirmed."16
The thrust of these decisions is that the President is subject to certain
constitutional limitations in the exercise of his constitutional powers. This is
not to say that, given a proper set of facts, the President could not have fully
exercised his powers. Had the Washington Post case involved publication of
information concerning an upcoming military offensive, or if acts of war had
actually closed the courts in Milligan and Duncan, the Court, upon balancing
the interests at stake, may have reached a different result. Thus, Presidential
power must be exercised within the framework of constitutional restraints:
both the constitutional power and its constitutional limitation must be bal-
anced to insure the legitimate exercise of that power and the protection of the
liberties likely to be affected.11 7
Does the Warrant Requirement Apply to a National Security Search?
Judge Wright's opinion in Zweibon is instructive on the issue of the
reasonableness of a warrantless national security search."" Recognizing the
importance of both foreign intelligence gathering and the protection of per-
sonal liberties, he concluded that the warrant requirement would best serve to
harmonize both interests." 9 In reaching this conclusion five possible justifi-
cations offered by the government for exempting national security surveil-
lances from prior judicial authorization were discussed. 20 These justifi-
cations-lack of judicial competence, security leaks, strategic information
gathering, administrative burden, and delay-were virtually the same as
those offered in Keith. 121 The Zweibon decision addressed each of these with
the same scrutiny employed in Keith and reached the same result in the area
of foreign security as Keith reached in the domestic area.
In both cases the Government posited that the judicial branch lacked the
competence to effectively perceive and decide questions involving foreign
security.' 22 In Keith, the Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating: "If
the threat is too subtle or complex for our senior lav enforcement officers to con-
vey ... one may question whether there is probable cause for surveillance.' 23
The Zweibon court was similarly unpersuaded where questions of foreign
security were involved. Essentially, it refused to accept the idea that the
Attorney General, chosen for his prowess as an attorney rather than as a
diplomat, was more capable than a federal judge to perceive and analyze the
115. Id. at 1328-29.
116. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
117. Cf. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d at 626-27.
118. Id. at 628-33.
119. Id. at 633-36.
120. Id. at 641-51.
121. 407 U.S. at 319-21.
122. Id. at 320; Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d at 641-47.
123. 407 U.S. at 320.
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issues raised by a foreign security surveillance. 124 This response seems quite
appropriate. There is no reason why a federal judge, deemed by the Supreme
Court to be sensitive and comprehending enough to pass upon probable cause
in domestic security cases, will become any less so when dealing with foreign
security cases. 125
On the question of security leaks the Government, in both Keith and
Zweibon, argued that the warrant provision would force the President to
reveal highly sensitive information. It claimed that providing this information
to the judiciary would increase the risk of a security leak which would, in
turn, endanger the national security. 126 Keith did not recognize a perceptible
increase in the risk of a security leak by virtue of a revelation to a federal
judge in domestic security cases.127 The Zweibon court found this argument
no more compelling in the context of foreign security.' 28 In addition to noting,
as did Keith, that warrant proceedings are ex parte, Zweibon espoused
Ifeventive measures which could be taken to guard against security leaks.
The Government, for example, could supply any clerical or secretarial per-
sonnel needed, thereby limiting the exposed material to a single judge and
insuring the utmost secrecy. 129 The Keith/Zweibon conclusion seems to be
correct, especially if the Executive supplies the necessary clerical personnel.
However, the risk of security leaks would probably be diminished even
further if a select group of judges, designated by the Chief Justice or another
appropriate member of the federal bench, was appointed to hear all foreign
security cases.
The Government urged in both cases that since these surveillances are
aimed primarily at the collection and maintenance of strategic information
they are less offensive to the fourth amendment than those surveillances
designed to end in a criminal prosecution. 130 In Keith, the Court apparently
accepted the Government's premise that the nature of domestic surveillances
was essentially non-prosecutorial, but refused to accept that an individual's
constitutionally protected freedoms are any less offended because of this. '3 ' In
Zweibon, the court, in reaching the same conclusion, refused to accept the
notion that foreign surveillances were non-prosecutorial. 13 2 The result
reached in Zweibon seems eminently sensible. Whatever the purpose of a
given surveillance may be, it seems clear that the same constitutional
infringements will result from its uncontrolled use. It is the means and not the
124. 516 F.2d at 641-42, 644.
125. Cf. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 320.
126. Id. at 320-21; Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d at 647-48.
127. 407 U.S. at 320-21.
128. 516 F.2d at 647.
129. 516 F.2d at 647; cf. Commission for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788,
794-95 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
130. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 318-19; Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516
F.2d at 648-49.
131. 407 U.S. at 320.
132. 516 F.2d at 648.
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ends of a given surveillance which the fourth amendment addresses.1 33
Indeed if these surveillances were non-prosecutorial the need for fourth
amendment protections would be heightened. Without a trial in which an
attempt is made to use the evidence seized without a warrant (or its fruits) all
judicial scrutiny would be bypassed. Thus the temptation to intercept non-
security information would only increase. 134
The added burden imposed upon the administration was also urged as a
justification for an exception to the warrant provision. 35 This argument was
summarily dismissed by Keith. 136 Likewise, the Zweibon court rejected the
argument in the foreign context, refusing to carve out an exception to the
protection afforded by the warrant provision based solely upon administrative
burdens. 137
The final justification offered in Zweibon was the danger caused by a delay
in instituting a foreign security surveillance. It was posited that foreign
security surveillance must be hastily employed and any delay, resulting from
compliance with the warrant procedure, would cause the loss of crucial
information thus threatening the national security.1 38 The argument, admit-
ted by the court to be the most persuasive, was both accepted and rejected in
part. It was accepted in relation to the apparent necessity for an exception to
the warrant requirement in exigent circumstances. These emergency situa-
tions, when time is of the essence, call for immediate executive action to
prevent the loss of information vital to the national security. However, the
court refused to suspend the warrant requirement in all foreign security cases
because of the mere potentiality of a rare situation requiring such an excep-
tion. 139 Although no similar argument was made concerning domestic security
in Keith, 140 the Zweibon result seems sound. The average length of a foreign
security surveillance is between seventy and two hundred days.' 4' Moreover,
the average surveillance is well planned and must be approved by a number
of administrative officials before it is employed. 4 7 Thus it appears that the
emergency situation is clearly exceptional. To exempt all foreign security
surveillances would be to let the exception govern the rule. 43 There may be
situations, however, where a surveillance may have to be immediately
instituted or the national security could be jeopardized. However, in these
cases the fourth amendment and the President's constitutional powers can be
133. See United-States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 320; Zweibon v. Mitchell,
516 F.2d at 649.
134. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 320.
135. Id. at 320; Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d at 650-51.
136. 407 U.S. at 321.
137. 516 F.2d at 651.
138. Id. at 649-50.
139. Id.
140. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 79 (views of Senators Abourezk, Hart, and Mathias).
141. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d at 650 & n.177.
142. Id. at 643.
143. Cf. id. at 650.
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reconciled. Certain searches which must be instituted without delay have
been held reasonable without a warrant. 144 Thus it would not be inconsistent
with prior fourth amendment cases to hold that the President may, in order to
carry out his constitutional duties, conduct warrantless national security
surveillances where there is no time to obtain a warrant.
Another justification, not offered in the Zweibon case, but possibly more
pursuasive, is that a foreign threat to the national security is more dangerous
than a domestic threat. The argument would be that a foreign threat may
have as its end a more drastic result than a wholly internal threat. However,
both an internal and external organization could have as its objective the
reorganization or elimination of our national structure. On the other hand, an
important distinction between these two types of organizations is found in the
resources available to a foreign and domestic organization. A domestic
organization, by definition, will derive its resources from wholly internal
sources. 145 This means that not only must the membership of the organization
consist only of persons within the United States, but also that the funds
necessary to carry on the organization must originate from donations of its
members and domestic sympathizers. A foreign organization, on the other
hand, has, in addition to all those resources open to its domestic counterpart,
any resources available from a foreign source. Thus, not only may its
membership be drawn from a larger area, but its operational costs may be
received from a larger pocket.
Even conceding that a foreign threat may be inherently more dangerous
than its domestic counterpart, there is no logical connection between this and
making it unreasonable, in all cases, to secure a search warrant. Certain
safeguards may be employed to account for any measurable difference be-
tween a foreign and a domestic security threat. Such safeguards could take
the form of an escape clause whereby the President, confronted with an
extremely dangerous situation, would be able to respond without first apply-
ing for a warrant. This would be much the same as the exigent circumstances
exception noted above. 146 Just as with the delay argument, for the court to
establish a general rule based upon the possibility of an emergency situation
would be to let the exception govern the rule.' 4 7 Clearly the better course,
rather than foreclosing fourth amendment protections, would be to carve a
specific exception to .fit these circumstances: to subject the President to the
warrant provision absolutely would, given an emergency situation, preclude
him from fulfilling his constitutional duty to defend and protect the Constitu-
tion.
144. E.g., United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802-03, 806-09 (1974) (discussion of the
exceptions to the warrant requirement of search incident to a lawful arrest and seizure of evidence
of criminal activity where it is likely to be destroyed); see note 9 supra and accompanying text.
145. Cf. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 309 n.8.
146. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d at 649-50.
147. Id.
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DOES THE FOREIGN SURVEILLANCE ACT UNDULY FETTER THE
CONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER?
The Inherently More Dangerous Foreign Threat
Assuming the validity of this argument-that a foreign threat is inherently
more dangerous than its domestic counterpart-the Foreign Intelligence Act
anticipates this problem. First, there is the exception clause in the presidential
power section which contemplates an unprecedented emergency situation
wherein the President is permitted to act upon his own determination that
such action is necessary. 48 Second, there is the 24-hour emergency provision
of section 2525(d) which enables the Attorney General to authorize a surveil-
lance upon his own authority by merely notifying one of the seven designated
judges.149 Third, there is the speedy appellate route provided by section 2523
insuring rapid hearings and decisions upon the denial of any order authorizing
a foreign security surveillance. °50 Given these three provisions, it is hard to
imagine a situation, even assuming the greater potential danger posed by
foreign threats to the national security, that is so bizarre as to evade both
emergency provisions and the rapid appellate route and yet remain so deadly
as to pose a significant threat to the national security. 15
Lack of Judicial Competence
Assuming that this argument is more persuasive in foreign security cases,
and that Keith's rejection of this argument in the domestic area is not
determinative in the foreign area, the Act, in designating certain federal
judges to hear applications for and grant orders approving foreign security
surveillances, seems to deflate it.'- 2 Even if they initially found the subject
difficult to grasp, the limited number of judges so designated would soon
develop expertise because of the frequency with which they would hear
foreign security surveillance applications. Given the lifetime tenure of a
federal judge and the relatively short tenure of an Attorney General, it may
not be long before the bench will be required to inform the Attorney General
of the pertinent subtleties. 5 3
Risk of Security Leaks
In addition to the ex parte approach embraced by Zweibon, the Act
provides that all applications and orders are to be sealed by the presiding
judge and protected by security measures to be prescribed by the Chief Justice
in consultation with the Attorney General.' 54 Thus the Attorney General has
148. Foreign Intelligence Act § 2528.
149. Id. § 2525(d).
150. Id. § 2523. These appellate routes are open to the Government as a matter of right. Id.
151. See Senate Report, supra note 7, at 79 (views of Senators Abourezk, Hart, and Mathias).
152. Foreign Intelligence Act § 2523.
153. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d at 644 & n.138.
154. Foreign Intelligence Act § 2523.
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a voice in insuring against the risk of security leaks by virtue of his own
safeguards. 15s
Danger of Delay
This argument is vitiated by the three emergency provisions of the Act
discussed in the above analysis of the inherently more dangerous foreign
threat. 156
Administrative Burden
In order to determine the added burden that the Act imposes upon the
administration, one must first review the procedure currently employed before
the implementation of a foreign security surveillance. At present, the request
must be very specific and must be approved by the FBI at several levels: up
to seven supervisors, three subordinate directors, and the Director of the
FBI.15 7 Further, the Attorney General must approve. 58 It appears that the
application called for by the Act requires not only less detailed information
but also significantly less procedural involvement. The Act, therefore, does
not appear to measurably increase the burden the Government has already
imposed upon itself.
THE NEED FOR A LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
It is apparent that either the courts or Congress may require the President
to obtain a warrant prior to employing a foreign intelligence surveillance.
However, due to the superior protection which it gives to both fourth
amendment rights and the national security, it is submitted that Congres-
sional legislation is the alternative which should be chosen.
The judicial branch, absent any legislation concerning foreign security
surveillances, would be able to afford fourth amendment protections in a
number of ways: a case by case approach;' 5 9 a general warrant approach with
an exception for exigent circumstances which necessitate immediate action; 160
155. Thus the Act provides the type of security measures which prompted the Supreme Court
in Keith to conclude that the possibility of security leaks do not necessitate a departure from the
warrant provision where domestic security is involved. See United States v. United States Dist.
Court, 407 U.S. at 321. The Act is also consistent with the Zweibon treatment of the same
argument. See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d at 647-48.
156. See notes 155-58 supra and accompanying text.
157. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d at 642-43.
158. Id.
159. This approach was suggested by the Third Circuit in United States v. Butenko, 494
F.2d 593 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974). The court left any fourth
amendment protections to the sanctions incident to post-search litigation. Thus only after the
surveillance had been discovered would its reasonableness be tested. Id. at 605.
160. This approach was suggested by the Zweibon decision. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d
594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). In Zweibon, the court, in
dictum, concluded that absent exigent circumstances a warrant is necessary before employing a
foreign security surveillance. Id. at 651 (dictum).
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or an absolute warrant requirement. 161 These alternatives all fail to ade-
quately protect either the national security or personal liberties affected by the
surveillance. The case by case approach places the government in the
unfortunate position of never being sure whether the surveillance they wish to
employ requires a warrant. That determination is left for subsequent judicial
scrutiny. Moreover, those who are supposedly protected by the warrant
requirement would be protected in a retroactive way-only after an illegal
surveillance were discovered would its validity be determined. 162 The second
approach, while protecting both the national security and personal liberties to
a limited extent, would still lend itself to executive abuse. The determination
of what are exigent circumstances will necessarily be a subjective judgment
on the part of the government. In the light of past abuses, the protection
afforded by this approach seems inadequate. 163 The third approach, while
appearing to protect personal liberties absolutely, would seriously jeopardize
the national security. Placing the national security in this precarious position,
in turn, jeopardizes the personal liberties thought to be protected since the
liberties granted by our constitutional form of government are no more secure
than the government itself. The President, faced with an emergency situation,
could not act with the required speed and thus would be prevented from
fulfilling his constitutional duty. Indeed, inasmuch as this approach would
prevent the President from fulfilling his constitutional responsibility, it is,
most likely, unconstitutional.164
These deficiencies noted, it seems the better course for Congress to provide
comprehensive legislation along the lines of the Foreign Intelligence Act. Such
legislation is capable of affording a greater degree of protection to both the
national security and personal liberty. It could be tailored in such a way that
the question of whether or not a given situation required prior judicial
authorization would require little or no guesswork on the part of the Govern-
ment. The Foreign Intelligence Security Act represents just such a com-
prehensive approach at filling the national security gap. Its provisions are
sufficiently definite to protect the individual's liberties from governmental
abuse yet flexible enough to provide for an emergency situation where the
national security demands governmental action without prior judicial authori-
zation. In essence, this Act appears to strike the necessary balance between
the need for intelligence surveillance and the protection of personal liberties
from its uncontrolled use. Hopefully, a similar act will be high on the list of
Congressional priorities in 1977.
Charles G. La Bella
161. This approach seems to have been adopted by the Supreme Court in Keith. Since the
argument of delay never came up, the Court did not consider what would happen in the case of
an emergency situation where the President had to act quickly. One can only assume the Court
would create an exception in such a situation where the domestic security was threatened. Cf.
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 318.
162. See United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied 419
U.S. 881 (1974). Cf. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 316-18.
163. See note 21 supra.
164. Cf. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 310.
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